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A number of academic studies suggest that from the mid-1990s onwards there were changes 
in the link between inflation and economic activity. However, it remains unclear the extent to 
which this phenomenon can be ascribed to a change in the structural relationship between 
inflation and output, as opposed to a change in the size and nature of the shocks hitting the 
economy. This paper uses a suite of models, such as time-varying VAR techniques, traditional 
macro models, as well as DSGE models, to investigate, for various European countries as 
well as for the euro area, the evolution of the link between inflation and resource utilization 
and its dependence on the nature and size of the shocks. Our analysis suggests that the 
relationship between inflation and activity has indeed been changing over time, while 
remaining positive, with the correlation peaking during recessions. Quantitatively, the link 
between output and inflation is found to be highly dependent on which type of shocks hit the 
economy: while, in general, all demand shocks to output imply a reaction of inflation of the 
same sign, the latter will be less pronounced when output fluctuations are driven by supply 
shocks. In addition, a sharp deceleration of activity, as opposed to a subdued but protracted 
slowdown, results in a swifter decline in inflation. Inflation exhibits a rather strong 
persistence, with a negative impact still visible three years after the initial shock.
 
Keywords: Demand shock, inflation response, macro model, output growth, Phillips curve.  
JEL: E31, E32, E37.  5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper investigates the links between output and inflation and the impact of an economic 
slowdown on prices. Modern macroeconomic theory would suggest that, in addition to 
demand conditions, supply shocks and expectations play an important role in the 
determination of inflation. We have mainly focused on the link between inflation and resource 
utilization, but also touched upon the effects of supply shocks.  
We start by surveying the academic literature. A key theme emerging is uncertainty around 
the extent of the output - inflation linkages; with a number of studies suggesting that from the 
mid-1990s onwards there were changes in the link between inflation and economic activity. 
However, it remains unclear whether these changes are due to a shift in the structural 
relationship between inflation and output or to a change in the size and nature of the shocks 
affecting the economy. 
Our approach has been to employ a suite of models, such as time-varying VAR techniques, 
traditional macro models, as well as DSGE models, for individual countries as well as for the 
euro area, to assess (i) whether the inflation process has indeed been changing over the last 
twenty years and (ii) the extent to which the response of inflation to output fluctuations 
depends on the nature and duration of the shocks hitting the economy. Our main results can 
be summarized as follows:  
x Using time-varying VAR techniques, our analysis suggests that the relationship 
between inflation and activity has indeed been changing over time, with the 
correlation peaking during recessions. 
x Depending on which type of shock hits the economy, inflation would be lower by up 
to 0.7 percentage points and prices by up to 1.5% after three years in response to a 
decline to GDP of 1%, excluding Hungary’s PUSKAS model which suggests declines 
of up to 3.3%. 
x To the extent that the decrease in output growth is driven by supply shocks, thus 
lowering potential output growth, the negative effect on inflation will be mitigated.  
x A sharp deceleration of activity, as opposed to a subdued but protracted slowdown, 
results in a swifter decline in inflation rates over a three year horizon.  
x Inflation exhibits a rather strong persistence, with a negative impact still visible three 
years after the initial shock. 6
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1. Introduction  
In the biennium 2008-2009 the world has been hit by a severe economic and financial 
downturn, the deepest since the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929. Moreover, in line 
with the substantial weakening of global demand and economic activity, inflationary 
pressures have been diminishing. However, it remains to be determined to what extent the 
moderation in consumer price inflation has been the result of reduced demand pressures rather 
than of favourable developments on the supply side. Modern macroeconomic theory would 
suggest that, in addition to demand conditions, supply shocks and expectations play an 
important role in the determination of inflation.  
In this exercise we want to investigate the sensitivity of inflation to developments in 
economic activity in the euro area by assessing (i) whether the link between inflation and 
output displays significant changes over time; (ii) to what extent the nature and duration of 
the shocks affect that link. The analysis is carried out using time-varying VAR techniques, 
traditional macro models and DSGE models, for individual countries as well as for the euro 
area as a whole. 
In the academic literature there were a number of studies suggesting that from the mid-1990s 
onwards, the properties of the inflation process have changed substantially in most advanced 
economies. Our own analysis using a time-varying VAR, allowing for stochastic volatility, 
seems to confirm this but does not give indications about the source of such a change. To 
assess the dependence of the inflation response to output fluctuations on the nature of the 
shocks hitting the economy, we have resorted to more structural models and assessed the 
impact on consumer inflation of alternative shocks to growth, such as a decline in: (a) foreign 
demand; (b) domestic demand; and (c) investment spending. In addition, we analyzed 
different time profiles for each shock. The main results show that, as expected, demand-
driven fluctuations induce larger price responses to restore the equilibrium; instead, when 
most of the shocks originate on the supply side of the economy, and thus affect its long-run 
growth properties, the impact on inflation is more moderate.  
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section two we present a literature review 
in order to provide a context for the current exercise. Section three discusses the time-varying 
VAR approach, with special emphasis on inflation development in the recent period. In 
section four, we briefly present the macro-econometric models used in this analysis, and the 
shocks and scenarios used in the macro-econometric models followed by the simulation 
results. Finally, in section five we summarize the results. In an appendix we provide 
additional tables and charts relating to the results, and describe the macro-econometric models 
used in this analysis.  7
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2. The inflation-output trade-off: a literature review 
The relation between inflation and economic activity has been a long standing building block 
of most business cycle theories; the main tool economists and policy-makers rely upon to 
understand this relation is the Phillips curve. Since its introduction, more than 50 years ago, 
the curve has been at the centre of an intense debate about its reliability as a tool for policy-
making.   
The failure of old-style Phillips curves at tracking and predicting the inflation dynamics of the 
1970’s and a growing literature on the fallacy of the curve as a structural relation, triggered by 
the Lucas’ critique, prompted, at the end of the 1970s, a number of attempts to resuscitate the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off, that found a major success in Gordon’s triangle model. 
According to this model, the change in inflation depends on three factors: inflation 
expectations, demand pull (represented by the deviation of an activity variable from its long-
run level) and supply shocks. The typical specification of an inflation process based on the 
triangle model (usually referred to as the accelerationist Phillips curve) is given by:  
  1
*
        ¦ ¦ t i t i j t j t cz u u b a S S ,                         (1) 
where ʌ is the inflation rate, the term ¦  j t j a S is a proxy for inflation expectations, the term 
(u-u*) represents deviations of the unemployment rate (or another demand variable) from its 
long run level, and z collects other control variables (like e.g. oil prices). For (1) being such 
that the price level accelerates when unemployment is below its long run level the restriction 
1   ¦ j a  has to be imposed. Specifications of the Phillips curve based on (1) performed well 
both in terms of in-sample fit and as forecasting models of inflation up to the early 1990s. 
Fuhrer (1995) performed various tests in order to assess the stability of the curve for the US, 
finding no evidence of structural changes in the Phillips curve coefficients and in particular in 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, represented by the sum of coefficients bi.  
From around the mid-1990s, most advanced economies were characterized by a period of low 
inflation, coupled with steady growth and diminishing unemployment. This combination of 
factors challenged once again the link between inflation and economic activity. A variety of 
studies documented striking changes in the properties of the inflation process in most 
industrialised countries: Cogley and Sargent (2002), using a Bayesian VAR with time-varying 8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1357
June 2011
coefficients, find the U.S. inflation process to be characterized by a lower persistence in the 
1990s compared with the two previous decades; Levin and Piger (2003) analyze the inflation 
process of twelve major industrialised countries, finding that they exhibit a shift in the mean 
and, once the latter has been taken into account, relatively low persistence since the 1980s
1. 
Altissimo et al. (2006) summary of the Eurosystem’s Inflation Persistence Network 
documents a drop in inflation persistence in the euro area.  
Supported by growing evidence, the hypothesis that the inflation process had changed in most 
countries has become a fairly well established stylized fact; it remains controversial whether, 
among the factors underlying the reduction in inflation variability, there is a change in the 
structural relationship between inflation and output as argued in Brayton, Roberts and 
Williams (1999), Williams (2006), Roberts (2006) or Kuttner and Robinson (2008) for the 
US. The latter possibility has been recently challenged by Smets and Wouters (2007), who 
show, by means of counterfactual exercises conducted through an estimated DSGE model, 
that most of the decline in inflation volatility seems to be due to a reduced volatility in the 
shocks underlying the inflation process rather than to structural changes in the Phillips curve 
parameters.  
Empirical evidence, supporting a weakening of the link between inflation and economic 
activity, motivated a number of authors to assess whether the Phillips curve remained a useful 
tool for inflation forecasting and policy guidance. Among others, Atkeson and Ohanian 
(2001) found that inflation forecasts delivered by Phillips curve models were less reliable than 
those of simple univariate competitors, signalling a clear instability in the economic 
relationships embedded in Phillips curves. Clark and McCracken (2003) conduct a number of 
simulations showing that the relatively poor predictive performance of Phillips curves is 
mainly attributable to shifts in the coefficients linking inflation to the output gap. The results 
of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) have been recently revisited by Stock and Watson (2008), 
who, beside confirming the unreliability of Phillips curve inflation forecasts in normal times, 
suggest that the curve may still be a useful forecasting tool when the economy is far from its 
long-run path (typically, at a turning point).   
A number of interpretations have been proposed to explain the observed changes in the 
inflation-output trade-off. A stream of literature focuses on the occurrence of changes in the 
structure of the labor market that can be responsible for the apparent flattening of the Phillips 
curve, implying that the link between inflation and economic activity would be essentially 
intact, once those changes are taken into account. Gordon (1997) finds that a smoothly 
                                                 
1 The change in the inflation process remains however a controversial issue; recently, Pivetta and Reis (2007) 
found no evidence of a significant change in the inflation behaviour. 9
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changing NAIRU improves the inflation forecasts obtained through a Phillips curve, thus 
reinforcing the view of a structural link between inflation and unemployment. This conclusion 
has been recently corroborated by Dickens (2008).  
A recent stream of literature, including Borio and Filardo (2007), Razin and Binyamini (2007) 
and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2006), suggests that globalization may have 
changed the slope of the Phillips curve. Among the sceptics, Ball (2006) and Gaiotti (2008), 
show that the evidence is not robust.  
Contrary to advocates of structural changes, a number of authors argue the flattening of the 
curve to be an achievement of good policies, which essentially affects the estimates from 
reduced form models, while not implying changes in the underlying pricing behaviour of 
firms. As such, this line of research implicitly supports the Lucas’ view of the Phillips curve 
as a non-structural relationship, not suitable for policy advice. Williams’ (2006) conclusions 
go in this direction when suggesting that the change in the slope of the Phillips curve may be 
rationalized with an improved anchoring of inflation expectations by more credible policy-
makers. Roberts (2006) makes this claim more explicitly, showing that the observed changes 
in Phillips curves are almost completely due to changes in the monetary policy reaction 
functions. Sargent, Williams and Zha (2006) argue that the key factor underlying the 
evolution of U.S. inflation in the post-70s period is a change in the monetary authority’s 
beliefs as to the slope of the Phillips curve. As those beliefs became consistent with an almost 
vertical Phillips curve the monetary authority pursued disinflationary policies, leading to an 
observed, though not truly structural, weakening of the link between inflation and 
unemployment. Smets and Wouters (2007) find that monetary policy may have contributed to 
the flattening of the Phillips curves, although to a modest extent.  
2.1 Evidence for the euro area 
The literature for the euro area has mainly focused on the so-called New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve (NKPC), while that on traditional accelerationist specifications is still relatively sparse. 
In the New Keynesian version of the curve, the lagged inflation terms are replaced by a future 
expectation, to give:  
 t t t t bx aE H S S     1 ,                         (2) 10
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where the term xt represents the output gap and is directly linked to the real marginal cost of 
production of the economy
2. This formulation has been found to be often inadequate for 
capturing dynamics and has been augmented with a lagged inflation term, to give the so-
called hybrid Phillips curve: 
   t t t t t bx a E a H S S S        1 2 1 1 ,                         (3) 
Empirical estimates of the slope of the Phillips curve in the euro area, both for traditional and 
for New Keynesian versions of the curve are surveyed in Table 1. The estimates do not differ 
wildly and for samples covering the last 30 years lie approximately in the range [0.1 0.4] 
(annualised) when the excess demand variable used in the Phillips curve is the output gap, and 
in the range [–0.2 –0.5] when the unemployment gap is used; the latter estimates are broadly 
consistent with those obtained using the output gap for values of the Okun’s law coefficient 
around -0.4/-0.5, as estimated by e.g. Fabiani and Mestre (2004) and, more recently, Perman 
and Tavera (2007). Slope coefficients in specifications using real marginal costs, while 
displaying a larger variability (estimates range between 0.04 and 0.56), confirm the relevance 
of the Phillips curve (in its hybrid specification) as a model for describing inflation dynamics 
in the euro area. 
There have been relatively few attempts aimed at formally testing whether the inflation-output 
trade-off has changed over time in the euro area, and, while there seems to be a general 
consensus over the apparent flattening of the Phillips curve in the last 15 years, the issue of 
the overall stability of the curve remains open. Among the studies that explicitly address this 
issue, one of the most comprehensive analysis for the euro area as a whole is that of Musso et 
al. (2007), who find evidence of shifts both in the mean of inflation and in the slope of the 
Phillips curve over the 1970-2005 period. In particular, the estimate of the output gap 
coefficient drops from around 0.5 in the 1970-1979 period to slightly more than 0.1 in the 
1980-2005 period. 
Recently, Paloviita (2008) documented a further reduction of the output gap coefficient from 
values between 0.1 and 0.2, depending on the Phillips curve specification, in the 1981-1993 
period, to values between 0 and 0.1 in the 1994-2006 period. Groen and Mumtaz (2008) reach 
opposite conclusions by allowing shifts in trend inflation when analyzing the performance of 
new Keynesian Phillips curves for the euro area, the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Bajo-
Rubio et al. (2007) evaluate the stability of the Phillips curve for Spain and, in spite of 
                                                 
2 In many empirical specifications of the NKPC, proxies of real marginal costs have been preferred to output gaps, 
due to the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of the latter variable, which often gives rise to counter-intuitive 
results. 11
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structural breaks in the inflation process, do not find evidence of instability of the coefficients 
of the curve.  






Excess demand variable Sample Estimated slope
Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) PC OLS A unemployment gap 1960-2001 -0.52
Fabiani and Mestre (2004) PC ML Q unemployment gap 1970-1999 -0.06
Logeay and Tober (2006) PC ML Q unemployment gap 1973-2002 -0.11
Schumacher (2008) PC ML Q unemployment gap 1979-2003 -0.086
Coenen and Wieland (2002) NKPC VAR Q output gap 1975-2000 0.02
Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) HPC PIV Q output gap 1998-2003 0.09
Djoudad and Gauthier (2003) HPC GMM Q (A) output gap 1983-2000 0.17
Domenech et al. (2001) HPC GMM Q output gap 1986-2000 0.06
Smets (2003) HPC GMM A output gap 1977-1997 0.18
Moons et al. (2007) HPC Bayesian Q output gap 1980-2005 0.09
PC OLS 1970-2005 0.28
TVPC NLLS 1970-1979 0.47
TVPC NLLS 1980-2005 0.13
1981-2006 0.16
1981-1993 [0.19 - 0.24]
(2)
1994-2006 [0 - 0.12]
(2)
PC OLS output gap 0.05
NKPC GMM real marginal costs [0.05 - 0.1]
(1)
HPC GMM real marginal costs [0.02 - 0.09]
(1)
Gagnon and Khan (2005) HPC GMM Q real marginal costs 1970-1998 0.01
Hondroyiannis et al. (2008) HPC OLS Q real marginal costs 1970-2005 0.07
GMM 0.56
ML 0.32
Sahuc (2002) HPC GMM A real marginal costs 1970-1998 0.06
Gali et al. (2001, 2003) Q 1970-1998
Jondeau and Le Bihan (2005) HPC Q (A) real marginal costs 1970-1999
Musso et al. (2007)
Paloviita (2008) HPC GMM A output gap
Q (A) output gap
Notes: 
PC: traditional Phillips curve; NKPC: New Keynesian Phillips curve; HPC: hybrid Phillips curve; TVPC: time varying coefficients Phillips 
curve.
Q: quarterly; Q (A): quarterly annualised; A: annual.
PIV: Panel data; instrumental variables estimation; VAR: vector autoregression; OLS: ordinary least squares; NLLS: non-linear least squares; 
ML: maximum likelihood; GMM: generalized method of moments.
(1) The range of estimates depends on different sets of identifying assumptions.
(2) The range of estimates depends on slight modifications of the empirical specification of the Phillips curve.
 
Evidence of nonlinearities for the euro area Phillips curve is at best mixed. Microeconomic 
evidence provided in Fabiani et al. (2006) suggests that demand variables have a larger effect 
on prices set by firms when demand falls than when it rises, implying a possible asymmetry in 
the Phillips curve at the aggregate level. On the other hand, another piece of the evidence 
presented by those authors suggests that positive cost shocks impact on prices more than 12
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negative shocks, a finding which is consistent with a different form of asymmetry in the 
Phillips curve. Analysis at the aggregate level does not help to settle the issue: Aguiar and 
Martins (2005) test for nonlinear Phillips curve specifications in the euro area, finding that, 
while the curve turns out to be linear, some nonlinearity can be estimated for the Okun’s law. 
Musso et al. (2007) do not find sufficient evidence in favour of nonlinear specification either. 
On the other hand, Dolado et al. (2005) investigate how nonlinear Phillips curve may affect 
the reaction function of the monetary authority and their findings are compatible with a 
convex Phillips curve for most European countries. Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) also find 
evidence of some nonlinearity in the curve, with an estimate of the slope that turns out to be 
no longer significant in periods of very low inflation. Baghli et al. (2007) estimate a 
nonparametric model to assess the degree of nonlinearity in the output-inflation trade off, 
finding that, for the euro area as a whole and for its major member economies, the Phillips 
curve is highly nonlinear, with the output costs of disinflations rapidly growing when the 
economy overheats.  
In the remainder of this paper we assess the sensitivity of inflation to economic activity with 
respect to both time-varying aspects and to possible nonlinearities associated to the nature, the 
size and the time path of the shocks hitting the economy. In the next section we will address 
some of these issues by estimating a bivariate model for the output and inflation of the euro 
area with time-varying parameters. 
3. Time-varying relationship between inflation and output in the euro area  
Figure 1 below shows the year-on-year HICP changes and the year-on-year GDP growth in 
the euro area over the sample 1981:Q1- 2010:Q3. A number of features emerge from this 
figure. We observe a fairly quick decline of inflation during the 1980’s until 1987. After that 
date, inflation declines more steadily from around 4% in the early 1990s to below 2% in the 
late 1990s. Subsequently, inflation was fairly stable in the euro area, until the recent period, 
which saw an increase to almost 4% in the middle of 2008 and then a subsequent drop in 
inflation due to base effects and following the collapse in demand, resulting in a negative 
inflation rate in 2009Q3. When the economy starts to recover at the beginning of 2010 there is 
also a rise in inflation which increases to above 2% by the third quarter of 2010, partly due to 
higher oil prices over this period. 13
ECB






















In this section we analyse the relationship between HICP inflation and GDP growth until the 
beginning of the most recent recovery by means of a Time Varying Coefficient Vector 
Autoregression (TV-VAR) model with stochastic volatility. This model allows both the 
autoregressive coefficients and the elements of the innovation covariance matrix to drift over 
time. That is, denoting the vector of endogenous variables as  [,] tt t zy S   where ʌt is the 
annual inflation rate and yt year-on-year GDP growth, we assume that zt has the following 
VAR representation: 
0, 1, 1 , ... tt t t p t t p t zA A z A z H        (4) 
where A0,t is a vector of time-varying intercepts, Ai,t are matrices of time-varying coefficients, 
i = 1,2...p and İt is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and time varying covariance matrix 
Ȉt. Let  01 [ , ,...., ] tt t p t A AA A {  and  () tt vec A T { , where vec(At) is the column stacking 
operator. The TV-VAR parameters, collected in the vector șt, are postulated to evolve 
according to: 
11 (, ) ( ) (, ) tt t tt p QI f Q TT T TT     14
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where I(șt) is an indicator function that takes a value of 0 when the roots of the associated 
VAR polynomial are inside the unit circle and is equal to 1 otherwise.  1 (, ) tt f Q TT   is given 
by: 
1 tt t T TZ     
where Ȧt is a Gaussian white noise with zero mean and covariance ȍ. Q is the covariance 
matrix of șt.  
The VAR reduced-form innovations in (4) are postulated to be zero-mean normally 
distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix Ȉt that is factorized as: 
'
tt t t FDF   ¦  
where Ft is lower triangular, with ones on the main diagonal, and Dt a diagonal matrix. Let ıt
be the vector of the diagonal elements of Dt
(1/2) and  t I  the off-diagonal element of the matrix 
1
t F
 . We postulate that the standard deviations, ıt, evolve as geometric random walks, 
belonging to the class of models known as stochastic volatility. The contemporaneous 
relationship  t I  among the two variables of the VAR is assumed to evolve as an independent 
random walk, leading to the following specifications: 
1 log( ) log( ) tt t V V[     
1 tt t I I\     
Where  ȟt  and ȥt are Gaussian white noises with zero mean and covariance matrix   and  . 
We postulate that ȟt  ȥt,  Ȧt and İt, are mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags. The 
parameters of the model are estimated by Bayesian techniques. A detailed description of the 
algorithm can be found in D’Agostino, Gambetti and Giannone (2009). We can use this 
statistical model to understand whether the link between inflation and output has been 
changing over time.  
From the estimated time-varying VAR model we compute the evolutionary cross-spectrum 
between inflation and GDP. Figure 2 plots these dynamic correlation coefficients derived as in 
Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001), between inflation and GDP year-on-year growth over the 
period 1988:Q2 – 2010:Q4. The vertical axis represents the correlation at business cycle 
frequencies. The correlation, in general, is quite low over time and over the frequency band, 
however, the picture also shows that the relationship between the two variables has been 15
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changing over time. In particular, the correlation peaks during the recessions (1992-1993 and 
the ongoing recession) and during the slowing down period (2001). Furthermore, the link 
between inflation and output is stronger in the second half of the sample from 2001. 
Figure 2 
















Inflation: Dynamic Correlation Coefficient (Business Cycle Frequencies)
This behaviour of the correlation coefficient over time seems to suggest that the inflation 
response to economic activity is stronger in recessions, thus corroborating the microeconomic 
evidence showing that the output/inflation link may be asymmetric, with demand variables 
affecting prices more when demand falls (see e.g. Fabiani et al., 2006). Also, the very low 
correlation during economic expansions is additional evidence of the increase in sacrifice 
ratios when the economy overheats, pointed out recently by Baghli et al. (2007), among 
others. The increase in the correlation coefficient over the most recent years of the sample 
seems to be in stark contrast with the literature documenting a decrease in the slope of the 
Phillips curve (e.g. Paloviita ,2008, and Musso et al., 2007). However, this increased 
correlation could well reflect the impact of higher oil prices observed during 2008, which 
disappeared in 2009 to come back in 2010, especially in its latter part, and reaching close to 
2008 levels in 2010Q4. As the economy and oil prices started to pick-up during 2010, there 
are signs that the correlation starts to decrease, but this change is small, suggesting perhaps 
that a higher correlation since 1999, could be more permanent. 
Existing evidence can be reconciled with the results of our TV-VAR model in at least two 
ways. First, existing literature documents a weaker causal link from output to inflation, while 
the unconditional correlation just shows the co-movement of the two variables. A weaker 
causality from output to inflation increases the output cost of disinflations and, therefore, 16
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induces stronger output responses to policy-induced shocks to inflation, which would result in 
higher unconditional correlation between output and inflation. Second, the existing literature 
focuses on the demand pressures on prices, documenting that this channel of price pressure 
seems to be less important in recent years than in the past. By contrast, the evidence displayed 
by the unconditional correlation is basically agnostic about the structural links between output 
and inflation, and it is not in contrast with the possibility that the joint behaviour of output and 
inflation over the period under review may have been determined by a combination of shocks 
that were, on the one hand, different for output and inflation and, on the other, inducing a 
moderation in consumer price dynamics during recession and a synchronization between 
output and inflation higher in the past decade than in the previous one. This possibility seems 
to be able to explain the surge in output-inflation correlation during recessions, according to 
Smets and Wouters (2004). These authors document that, during the 1992-1993 recession, 
both output and inflation in the euro area were mainly driven by negative investment shocks 
inducing a drop both in economic activity and in inflation. During the subsequent recovery 
the sources of output and price dynamics were instead different and, above all, implying 
opposite effects on the two variables: while output growth was primarily driven by a positive 
shock to the labour supply, the main driving force underlying consumer inflation were 
negative shocks to the inflation objective; the latter seems to be consistent with a convergence 
path of the European countries towards the EMU. The slowdown experienced in 2001 was 
again the result of different shocks, inducing however a similar response in output and 
inflation: output growth was damped by negative productivity shocks, whose positive effect 
on inflation was more than offset by the counteracting effect of a combination of lower 
inflation objective and, to a major extent, negative price mark-up shocks. The latter are 
consistent with the increased frequency of price decreases, documented at the microeconomic 
level by Angeloni et al (2006), occurring in coincidence with the euro cash changeover and 
various VAT measures at the beginning of the 2000s.  
Figure 3 shows the unconditional inflation forecast implied by the model. In the absence of 
exogenous shocks such as an oil price shock, inflation should be stable and low (green line) 
for all of 2009; from the beginning of 2010 inflation should gradually increase to almost 1% 
by the end of 2011. The dotted blue lines around the forecasts are the confidence bands; they 
are quite wide, signalling high uncertainty around the predictions. 
All in all, this suggests that the assessment of the effects of output fluctuations on inflation 
has to be conducted by properly identifying whether there are demand pressures acting on 
consumer prices, and whether other factors may offset these pressures. An example would be 17
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the development of oil prices, which could be positively related to demand, and would also 
reinforce upward pressures on inflation. 
For this reason, in the rest of the paper we will analyse in more detail the behaviour of 
inflation in response to shocks to the economy of different types, sizes and time profiles.  
Figure 3













4. Simulations to show the inflation sensitivity to economic activity  
Economic textbook reasoning suggests that the size and sign of the impact of an economic 
slowdown on inflation depends on the nature of the shocks underlying the slowdown with 
supply and demand shocks affecting inflation differently. Compared with the time-varying 
VAR approach from the previous section, using large-scale macro models will enable to 
assess the impact of a slowdown of economic activity on inflation due to different sources of 
shocks. 
In this section, we start by giving a summary of the various models (both DSGE and 
traditional macroeconomic models) used in this exercise, before going into more detail 
regarding the price formation mechanisms in these models, namely the Phillips curve 
specifications. Then, results are presented of several model-based simulations aimed at 
assessing the impact of a slowdown of economic activity on inflation. 18
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4.1 Summary of macro models  
Appendix A summarizes the various open economy macro models used for the simulation 
analysis and highlights their similarities as well as their different features. The eight models 
vary in numerous features, however, they can be broadly divided into two main groups based 
on their type – 4 traditional and 3 DSGE models – with the ECB’s New Multi-country Model 
(NMCM, see Dieppe et al., 2011a and 2011b) being somewhere in the middle. The four 
traditional models are the Spain’s MTBE model (Ortega et al., 2007), Latvia’s 
Macroeconomic Model (LMM, see Benkovskis, and Stikuts, 2006), Bank of Italy Quarterly 
Model (BIQM, Banca d’Italia, 1986), and Hungary’s Quarterly Projection Model (NEM, see 
Benk et al., 2006). The three DSGE models, estimated with Bayesian methods, are the ECB’s 
New Area Wide Model (NAWM, see Christoffel et al., 2008), Spain’s BEMOD model (see 
Andrés, et al., 2009), and Hungary’s PUSKAS model (see Jakab and Világi, 2008). 
Three of these models explicitly include the euro area (NAWM, and BEMOD), or at least a 
large part of a monetary union (NMCM, which models the five largest euro area economies). 
Although the main goal of the exercise is the sensitivity of inflation in the euro area, the 
results for some individual countries can give us useful information about the effect of a 
slowdown. Therefore, the analyses also covered five other, individual country models (Spain, 
Italy, Latvia, and two models for Hungary), results of which can provide useful consideration.  
In all these models, the inflation process is modelled by some variant of the Phillips curve. In 
Table A2 in Appendix A, we report the key parameters of the general hybrid new Keynesian 
Phillips curve form (see equation 3), which consists of the Calvo parameter, the backward 
indexation term, and a marginal costs/output gap term. This should be considered for some 
cases only illustrative, as for some models, the specification doesn’t directly translate into this 
framework
3, nonetheless it should give us an idea of the different persistence of inflation. We 
follow Altissimio et al. (2006), summary of the Eurosystem’s Inflation Persistence Network 
by considering the three main factors affecting price response to shocks under a hybrid new 
Keynesian Phillips curve framework: 
(i) Extrinsic persistence, which is due to shocks to marginal costs or output gap. We see that 
for all models, the slope of the Phillips curve is small, suggesting significant price stickiness.  
                                                 
3 Notably in the case of the NMCM, the specification contains a time-varying discount factor, therefore the 
parameters in the table are normalised around a constant discount factor. Whilst the Phillips curve specification in 
the MTBE, NEM and LMM models are backward looking, they are nonetheless richer in terms of driving 
fundamentals. 19
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(ii) Intrinsic persistence, which is the extent of dependence of inflation on its own past. We 
can see that BEMOD-Spain is the most forward-looking model, followed by the other DSGEs 
(BEMOD-Rest of the euro area, NAWM and PUSKAS), suggesting a decrease in the degree 
of inflation persistence. Whilst the NMCM is estimated to have a strong forward-looking 
component, this is nonetheless less than the DSGE models. The more traditional macro 
models have strong intrinsic persistence. As we will see, this partly explains the differences 
across models. For Italy’s BIQM model, the main Phillips curve is on the wage equation, 
which is fully forward-looking. However, expectations are formed by learning, which 
effectively adds intrinsic persistence. 
(iii) Expectation formation, and how it affects inflation formation is also crucial. In the 
DSGE models, expectations are model-consistent. Rational expectations wouldn’t add any 
additional persistence to inflation, but imperfect information
4, or expectations based on 
learning would. In the NMCM, PUSKAS and BIQM, learning plays a crucial role, adding 
further persistence to price settings. 
In the large-scale macro models considered, the Phillips curve is only one aspect of the 
economy. Wage formation may add further stickiness to inflation and the interaction of 
driving fundamentals is also clearly important. Given the large-scale models used in the 
Central Banks, doing full model simulations would give us a better idea of how the economy 
and prices respond to shocks. 
4.2. Shocks and scenarios 
This section presents the results of several model-based simulations aimed at assessing the 
impact of a slowdown of economic activity on inflation. Compared with the time-varying 
VAR approach from section three, such an exercise will give a possibility to look on the 
inflation sensitivity from a different angle. While previously the focus was on the changes in 
inflation sensitivity over time, in this section we can discuss the reaction of inflation to 
different types of demand and supply shocks. The three shocks considered are: 
(i) A decline in foreign demand, where the decline in GDP growth is driven by a 
sequence of negative shocks to foreign demand.  
(ii) A decline in domestic demand, primarily affecting consumption.  
(iii) A decline in investment spending. Here we introduce a supply shock, which has a 
direct impact on the supply side of the economy.  
                                                 
4 A number of the DSGE models are simulated as a series of unanticipated shocks.  20
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Not only the source, but also the profile of a slowdown is known to influence the strength of 
the disinflationary effects. For the different countries in the euro area, the recent recession has 
taken different profiles, some of them entering aggressively into the recession but recovering 
faster while others witnessing a softer start of the recession but a longer downturn period. 
Therefore, for each type of shock, two alternative profiles have been considered:  
(i) a  subdued, but protracted slowdown in economic activity, corresponding to a 
uniform downward shift in quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth (by 1/12 ppts) over a 
three-year period; and 
 
(ii) a sharp, but diminishing slowdown ("V-shape"), in which quarter-on-quarter real 
GDP growth drops by 0.5 ppts in the first quarter and then by 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05 and 
0.05 ppts in the subsequent five quarters. 
Both profiles are calibrated to have the same effect on GDP growth, giving rise to a 

















Combining the different shocks and the different time profiles for the shocks, we arrive at the 
six different scenarios.
5 We employ the usual assumptions that nominal interest rates, 
exchange rates and most fiscal variables are treated as exogenous, with the exception of 
BEMOD, where these are endogenous and with the NAWM and PUSKAS model we report 
scenarios with either policy rules endogenous or exogenous, so we can compare the impact.  
                                                 
5 In the case of MTBE, we have only conducted simulations for the “subdued but protracted” scenario. 21
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In the next three subsections we report the simulation results for the three types of shocks and 
the two different time profiles. In section 4.2.1, we discuss the foreign demand shocks under 
the subdued slowdown scenarios. In section 4.2.2, we analyze the shocks to domestic 
demands, and the investment shocks are discussed in section 4.2.3. Then, in section 4.3 and 
section 4.4 we compare across the different time path and sources of shocks. In the summary 
tables and charts, variables are reported as percentage deviation from baseline levels.  
4.2.1. Foreign shocks 
At the origin of the 2008-2010 recession, all economies in the eurozone were hit by a 
substantive negative shock from the rest of the world. All models identify this negative 
foreign demand shock among the main ones behind the fall in activity. Here we simulate a 
decline in growth driven by a sequence of negative shocks to foreign demand. In this scenario 
all models assume that only foreign demand is changing, whereas all other foreign variables 
are unchanged
6. In general, other changes in the international environment would also affect 
the domestic economy (e.g. changes in foreign prices will give rise to wealth effects through 
changes to the terms of trade; a financial channel will impact the domestic economy via 
changes in foreign interest rates and exchange rates). However, in our scenario we assume, 
that only foreign demand is changing, whereas all other foreign variables are unchanged.  
The foreign demand shock would impact the domestic economy through various channels. 
First, lower foreign demand would directly affect exports and growth. Second, the reaction 
from exporter firms would affect the rest of the economy and the effects of the shock would 
be hence more broadly propagated. 
The price of domestic exports is slow to adjust to the decrease in world demand. This fuels a 
short-run decrease in export demand and, given slow adjustment of other demand 
components, output immediately undershoots its long-run level. Factor utilisation decreases as 
supply capacity is relatively slow to adjust. Firms decrease their demand for labour, 
increasing unemployment. Though prices are sticky, they are not fixed and inflation falls 
below the baseline as firms react to lower demand and lower marginal costs or more negative 
output gap: the net effect is for inflation to decrease below its baseline value. 
                                                 
6 This is, admittedly, not very realistic, but it serves the purpose of highlighting the foreign demand channel, and 
makes it easier to interpret the results. In the NMCM, each country is shocked individually, and the countries are 
not linked. Since BEMOD includes both Spain and the rest of the Euro area as endogenous blocks, two sets of 
simulations with this model: in the first one shocks are calibrated so that the Spanish GDP follows the target paths, 
in the other the same is done for euro area GDP 
 22
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The impulse responses of prices to a subdued but protracted shock across models and 
countries are presented in Table 2 and Figure 5. 
Following a gradual decline in world demand, the different models give a broadly similar 
response with the initial impact on price being small but becoming larger over time. After 
three years the range of price responses in the models without monetary policy reaction is 
fairly large: prices are between 0.1% and 0.9% lower compared to the baseline, with most 
models yielding falls between  0.3% and 0.8%, in response to a decline to GDP of 1%. This 
translates into a reduction in annual inflation of between 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points.  
The largest inflation responses are for forward-looking models with learning (NMCM and 
BIQM) which have forward-looking Phillips curves but expectations follow a learning 
approach that adds persistence to the inflation process, but also the more traditional models of 
Spain’s MTBE and Hungary’s NEM, where prices are purely backward looking also show 
relatively large price responses to a foreign demand shock. The price responses after 3 years 
are less for DSGE models like NAWM and Hungary’s PUSKAS where prices are both more 
forward looking, and rational, and the Phillips curve has a smaller response to the mark-up 
than the NMCM. In the Latvian LMM model the price responses are very limited, being not 
more than 0.15% lower compared to baseline at the end of the three year horizon. For the 
NMCM, the estimated Phillips curves are still more backward looking than those for the three 
DSGE models considered, NAWM, BEMOD and PUSKAS, which correspondingly have 
smaller price effect for this scenario. 
The results using DSGE models with endogenous monetary policy and exchange rate 
reactions are also reported. In particular we report results for the BEMOD from the Bank of 
Spain, which covers both Spain and the euro area. We also compare simulations from the 
NAWM and PUSKAS with endogenous policy to those with exogenous policy to enable us to 
isolate the impact of monetary policy.  
When including endogenous monetary policy reactions, inflation will be affected by the 
response of interest rates to shocks and also by the effect of the corresponding exchange rate 
changes in imported inflation, and agents will take this into account when forming their 
expectations and will change their actions accordingly. Compared to the model results with 
exogenous monetary policy, price responses are now smaller because interest rates decrease 
offsetting to some extent the downward price pressures coming from weaker demand. 
 23
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country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Spain Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM MTBE NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.21 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.03 0.00 0.00 Ͳ0.01 0.02 Ͳ0.02
2 Ͳ0.54 Ͳ0.13 Ͳ0.10 Ͳ0.40 Ͳ0.20 Ͳ0.38 Ͳ0.17 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.09 0.03 Ͳ0.08










































4.2.2. Domestic demand shocks 
In most countries across Europe, private demand was severely hit. This negative shock to 
demand could take a variety of forms, from a shock to confidence to a wealth shock. Here we 
report the response of prices to a shock to domestic demand. Given the different modelling 
approaches it was impossible to harmonise the shocks across models, so this shock has been 
implemented in different ways across different models (e.g. a shock to: risk premium, 
consumption preference, financial wealth, cost of capital, interest rate spreads)
7. Therefore, 
one should be careful when comparing results. However in all models, the effect on private 
spending is a fall in consumption and some (secondary) downward impact on investment (e.g. 
from higher cost of capital). This reduction in demand and output puts downward pressure on 
prices. Furthermore, through the decline in inflation, domestic producers are becoming more 
competitive, so exports tend to increase and imports decline leading to an improved trade 
balance. 
                                                 
7 Within the NAWM, the decline in domestic demand has been implemented by a sequence of domestic risk 
premium shocks, while in the NMCM the shock is to interest rate spreads. In the Bank of Italy's BIQM model the 
shock is implemented as a shock to the risk premium, assuming that it hits the rate relevant for consumption 
decisions only; in Bank of Hungary’s traditional NEM model the shock was implemented through shocks to the 
risk premium and to household income; in Bank of Hungary DSGE model this scenario is represented by a series 
of shocks to consumption preferences and the cost of capital. In the Bank of Spain’s DSGE model, BEMOD, the 
impact comes via shocks to consumption preferences, while in the Bank of Spain’s traditional macro model, 
MTBE, it is implemented through a reduction in the financial wealth of households. Finally, in the Bank of 
Latvia’s model,LMM, the domestic demand shock was produced by direct shock to the residual of consumption 
equation.  24
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The impulse responses of prices to the subdued but protracted slowdown in domestic demand 
are presented in Table 3 and Figure 6. Generally, the responses are not very different 
compared to the foreign demand shock, with prices lower in the exogenous policy scenario by 
0.1% to 0.9% after 3 years compared to the baseline (or equivalently annual inflation lower 
by 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points). The exception is in the Hungarian PUSKAS model where the 
responses are much larger, as without offsetting monetary policy domestic prices are very 
sensitive to the decline in consumption. 
We also report results from the DSGE models with endogenous interest rates and exchange 
rates. Price responses for the for Hungarian PUSKAS model are smaller than with exogenous 
policy and broadly in line with BEMOD. However, price responses are not smaller with 
endogenous policy reaction in the case of  the NAWM, where the shock was implemented by 
a sequence of domestic risk premium shocks,  since the reaction of exchange rates lead to an 





country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Spain Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM MTBE NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.21 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.43 Ͳ0.08 0.01 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.02 0.00 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.01 Ͳ0.03
2 Ͳ0.54 Ͳ0.14 Ͳ1.58 Ͳ0.39 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.37 Ͳ0.14 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.20 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.10 Ͳ0.15










































4.2.3. Investment-specific shocks 
Firms have been widely affected in the recent recession through not only the fall in foreign 
and domestic demand, but also by other factors like financial difficulties or other supply 
factors.  In this section, we introduce a shock which has a direct impact on the supply side of 25
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the economy. It has been implemented in slightly different ways across models, but in each 
case can be considered as a direct shock to investment
8. Compared to the previous foreign and 
domestic demand shocks, this supply-side shock affects inflation through an additional 
channel: an investment-specific shock leads to a more pronounced decline in the capital stock, 
thereby becoming a scarce factor of production and affecting the supply side of the economy 
in such a way that prices could go up. This then mitigates some of the disinflationary 
pressures coming from a fall in investment demand. However, the supply-side effects are 
different in magnitude and nature across models. 
Table 4 and Figure 7 show the inflation responses across countries and models to the subdued 
but protracted scenario for GDP. Obviously, the fall in investment is more pronounced, while 
that of consumption is less severe, as the same reduction in GDP is driven by the exogenous 
increase in the cost of capital, thus impacting directly investment. Overall, prices fall by 
between 0.1% and 0.8% at the end of the horizon for models with exogenous monetary 
policy, and annual inflation rates are between zero and 0.3 percentage points lower. With 
endogenous monetary policy, interest rates fall according to the Taylor rule in order to help 
undo the fall in output caused by this shock
9; negative pressures on prices are thus partly 
compensated. Together with the effect of more powerful supply channels, this makes the 
NAWM, PUSKAS and BEMOD models show smaller drops in inflation.  
The reason behind the rise in prices in the BEMOD-Spain simulations lies in the intensity of 
the supply-side effects of this shock due to the different parameter estimates for Spain than 
for the rest of EMU. In particular, two parameters are making the most of the difference. On 
the one hand, estimated investment adjustment costs are much lower for Spain, which 
exacerbates the fall in capital in that economy, lowering more the marginal product of labor 
and hence increasing further the marginal cost of the economy, which translates into higher 
prices. On the other hand, wage indexation to past CPI inflation is estimated to be much larger 
in Spain than in the rest of EMU. Wages are very sticky in Spain, which prevents them from 
adjusting downwards fast when marginal product of labor is falling as is the case in this 
shock. As a result real marginal costs increase more in Spain (BEMOD-Spain simulation) 
than if the shock occurred in the rest of the EMU economy (BEMOD-EMU). 
                                                 
8 This has been implemented via a set of investment-specific technology shocks in the NAWM and through shocks 
to the capital stock in the NMCM. In the BIQM, the shock has been modelled as a business confidence shock. In 
BEMOD, the investment-specific productivity shock is used, while in the traditional macro model this shock is 
represented by an increase in firms' financing costs. In the NEM the shock is implemented through positive shocks 
to the risk premium that increases the cost of capital and lowers the demand for investment, while in the DSGE 
model this scenario is represented by a series of shocks to the cost of capital. Finally, in the LMM model, the 
implementation was via a direct shock to the residual of the investment equation.. 
 
9 In the case of BEMOD-Spain, the weight of Spain in the monetary policy decisions is very small (as opposed to 
the rest of the euro area in the BEMOD-EMU simulations) and this effect is operating at a much lower intensity. 26
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country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Spain Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM MTBE NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.21 Ͳ0.01 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.08 0.00 Ͳ0.07 Ͳ0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.01
2 Ͳ0.54 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.32 Ͳ0.37 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.30 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.01 0.04 Ͳ0.10 Ͳ0.08










































4.3. Sharp but diminishing versus subdued but protracted shock 
We now turn to the case of the sharp but diminishing slowdown where the drop in GDP is 
more severe, but short-lived, see Figure 8. Since the mechanisms involved are the same as 
before and the observed responses are relatively similar to the subdued but protracted shock, 
we can be quite brief. The price effects are transmitted slowly in both subdued and sharp 
scenarios with very little impact on prices at the end of the first year. The exception being the 
Hungarian PUSKAS model, where there are already significant effects in the first year for the 
domestic demand and investment shocks. However, by the end of the third year, differences 
between the 'subdued, but protracted' and 'sharp but diminishing’ scenarios emerge, with the 
sharp but diminishing slowdown in real GDP growth generally implying a swifter and more 
sizeable deceleration of inflation over the projected horizon. Indeed, the impact on prices can 
be up to double compared to the subdued slowdown. The one exception is for BEMOD Spain 
with endogenous policy where inflation is positive (see explanation above). 
In the sharp but diminishing slowdown, firms and unions react to the quicker slowdown by 
reducing prices and wages. This reduces the cost side pressure on inflation, further 
strengthening the decrease in inflation. This partly reflects the speed of adjustment of wages 
and employment, where the rapidity of adjustment depends on the sharpness of GDP 
slowdown, and to some degree the persistence of wages and employment, and the degree of 27
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forward-lookingness of firms and households. Indeed, the stronger response could be partly 
because, with the sharp shock, the corporate sector is forced into a quicker adjustments in 
wages and employment, whereas in the subdued shock it is a gradual process, so wages and 
prices are only reduced gradually. 
We also performed the exercise with the time-varying VAR from section 3, see Figure B4 in 
the Appendix.. The sharp and protracted scenarios imply quite similar paths (in deviation 
from the unconditional forecast) for future inflation. A sharper fall of GDP translates into 
lower inflation until the sixth quarter of the shock, while after this date inflation rates, implied 
by the sharp scenario, are slightly higher than those implied by the protracted one. Both tend 
to converge back to the inflation rate of the baseline forecasts after 11 quarters. Overall, the 
TV-VAR suggests that after 3 years prices would be lower by 0.4% and average annual 
inflation lower by 0.2 percentage points. However, there is large uncertainty around these 
results, but it is important to note that they are within the range of model estimates. 
Overall, the results provide a wide range of estimates of the impact of a cumulative decline in 
GDP of 1%, suggesting prices would be lower by between 0.1% and 1.5% after 3 years, with 
Hungary’s PUSKAS model showing declines of up to 3.3%. Without allowing for the 
corresponding reaction of the monetary policy (through a Taylor rule), average annual 
inflation would be lower by up to 0.7 percentage points in these 3 years. An alternative way 
of reporting these results is in terms of sacrifice ratios. This would suggest a 1ppt decline in 
inflation would mean GDP is lower by between 1.5% and 10%. This compares with Durand 
et al. (2008) average estimate of 2% for the euro area for the period 1994 to 2003 under short-
run identification restrictions. 
4.4. Comparing foreign, domestic and investment specific shocks 
As could be expected, the results vary quantitatively and qualitatively depending on the 
source of the shock, even if the effect on output is the same in all simulations. In particular, 
shocks to prices and to productivity that would cause a slowdown would also cause an 
increase in prices, while GDP-equivalent demand shocks would cause a decline in prices. 
Figure 9 compares the effects of world versus domestic versus investment shocks after three 
years. 28
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Overall the results seem to suggest that after three years with exogenous monetary policy and 
exogenous exchange rates, the largest impact on prices occurs after a foreign demand shock, (the 
exception is Hungarian PUSKAS model due to having separate domestic and export sectors), and 
the smallest price responses come from the investment shock as this shock has stronger supply-
side effects, partially offsetting the downward inflationary pressures. 
However, there are some differences across models. In particular, it matters whether the 
simulations were with exogenous or with endogenous policy reactions. Furthermore, the 
treatment of expectations is crucial (backward-looking, rational forward-looking, learning), as 
well as price and wage stickiness (frequency of changes, degree of indexation), and in general the 
extent of labour market flexibility. 
Some of these differences in results could be due to different country structures (e.g. different 
import content of different demand categories), but could also just reflect differing model choices. 
In Appendix C, we briefly consider the propagation mechanisms in each model. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study has been to investigate the impact of business cycle fluctuations on HICP 
inflation in the euro area and across euro area countries, taking into account different shocks and 
assumptions regarding the path of real output growth.  
Modern macroeconomic theory would suggest that, in addition to demand conditions, supply 
shocks and expectations play an important role in the determination of inflation. In this exercise 
we have mainly focused on the link between inflation and resource utilization, but also touched 
upon the effects of supply shocks.  
A large number of studies tend to suggest that the inflation process has changed in most countries, 
since the mid-1990s. However, it remains unclear whether, among the factors underlying the 
reduction in inflation variability, there is a change in the structural relationship between inflation 
and output, a decreased volatility of shocks or if better monetary policy is the main determinant. 
Using time-varying VAR techniques, our analysis suggests that this relationship has indeed been 
changing over time, with the correlation peaking during recessions, and thus demand has a 
stronger impact on inflation during downturns. The extent to which the latter result is due to 
different structural properties of the Phillips curve during economic slowdowns (a possibility 31
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raised by Baghli et al., 2007, among others), rather than to the occurrence of a particular 
combination of shocks hitting the economy in the period under review, as suggested by Smets and 
Wouters (2004), remains to be analyzed in more depth, although the analysis conducted with the 
macro-econometric models suggests the latter is a potentially relevant factor.  
Our approach has been to employ a suite of models, such as time-varying VAR techniques, 
traditional macro models, as well as DSGE models, for individual countries as well as for the 
euro area. In addition, we have investigated the effect of different types of shocks, alternative 
paths for real output growth, and different assumptions about the response of monetary policy. 
This methodology gives rise to a rather wide range of inflation responses. We tend to regard this 
as an advantage, compared to restricting the analysis to a single model or country.  
The last recession was caused by a variety of shocks, to external as well as internal demand and 
also to supply, and the slowdown in activity has shown different profiles in different European 
economies. In this paper we use a range of macroeconomic models, built at various central banks 
for the analysis of their individual economies as well as for the euro area as a whole, to illustrate 
the mechanisms through which inflation responds to the main shocks behind a recession like the 
recent one, and we quantify the responses for different profiles of a downturn. 
Depending on which type of shocks hits the economy, we found that in response to a decline to 
GDP of 1%, inflation would be lower by up to 0.7 percentage points in the euro area. Inflation 
exhibits a rather strong persistence, with a negative impact still visible three years after the initial 
shock. Equivalently, prices would be lower by up to 1.5% after 3 years, excluding Hungary’s 
PUSKAS model which suggests declines of up to 3.3%. For the euro area as a whole, the NAWM 
estimate of the impact on prices is up to 1%. To the extent that the decrease in output growth is 
driven by supply shocks, thus lowering potential output growth, the negative effect on inflation 
and prices will be mitigated. 
An alternative way of reporting these results is in terms of sacrifice ratios. This would suggest 
that a one percentage point decline in inflation would mean that GDP is lower by between 1.5% 
and 10%. This compares with Durand et al. (2008) average estimate of 2% for the euro area for 
the period 1994 to 2003. We also find that a sharp deceleration of activity, as opposed to a 
subdued but protracted slowdown, results in a swifter decline in inflation rates over a 3 year 
horizon.  32
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6. Appendix A: Macro models summary and their Phillips curve estimates
The three DSGE models, estimated with Bayesian methods, are the ECB’s NAWM, Spain’s 
BEMOD model, and Hungary’s PUSKAS model. The NAWM and the BEMOD include 
explicitly the euro area which is divided into Spain and rest of the euro area in BEMOD, while 
PUSKAS includes only one country (Hungary) facing the rest of the world. The rest of the world 
is exogenous in BEMOD and PUSKAS, while in the NAWM it arises as a pre-recursive block of 
foreign variables.  
All of the three DSGE models are used in policy simulations, and forecast decomposition, further 
BEMOD and the NAWM in counterfactual analyses, and only the NAWM in providing 
projections. In addition, all of the three models contain model-consistent expectations, besides 
PUSKAS also features learning in the inflation process. Furthermore, the agent structure of the 
three models consists of utility maximizing households, government conducting fiscal as well as 
monetary policy, and firms although the firms’ types differ to some extent in each model. In the 
NAWM and BEMOD there are firms producing tradable and non-tradable goods while in 
BEMOD additionally those producing durable goods. In the PUSKAS model, firms are divided 
into domestic and exporting firms respectively.  
The ECB’s NMCM contains 5 endogenous country blocks and with the rest of the world being 
exogenous, and is used in projections, counterfactual analysis and policy simulations. The model 
is based on optimizing agents (households, firms, unions, and governments). It has explicit 
treatment of expectations, with one version having rational model-consistent expectations. 
However, for this exercise, expectations are formed via learning. It is estimated with advanced 
classical techniques.  
Finally, the four traditional models are the Spain’s MTBE model, Latvia’s LMM model, Bank of 
Italy Quarterly Model (BIQM), and Hungary’s NEM model. Each of the traditional models 
represents a one-country model which faces an exogenous foreign economy. The MTBE, the 
LMM and the NEM are similar in some features. All three of them are used in projections and 
simulation analyses for scenarios, do not have forward-looking expectations, and have similarly 
simple agent structure (households, firms and government), though in the NEM there is no fiscal 
policy rule. The BIQM is used in policy simulations, and has both learning and ad-hoc 
expectations. Furthermore, considering the actors, the BIQM contains also banks. 33
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Table A2: Phillips curve estimates of the models
NAWM Euro area 0.92 0.41 0.005 0.77 0.63
BEMOD
2
Spain 0.90 0.27 0.010 0.61 0.77
BEMOD
2
Rest of Euro area 0.93 0.35 0.004 0.69 0.16
PUSKAS Hungary 0.92 0.43 0.005 0.66 0.19
NMCM France 0.75 0.35 0.013 0.74 0.34
NMCM Germany 0.76 0.38 0.012 0.80 0.44
NMCM Italy 0.73 0.32 0.008 0.73 0.33
NMCM Spain 0.67 0.25 0.050 0.75 0.36
NMCM Netherlands 0.69 0.28 0.027 0.71 0.30
BIQM
3
Italy - - -0.012 / 0.180 - -
MTBE
4
Spain - - 0.400 - -
NEM
5
Hungary - - 0.080 - -
LMM
6
Latvia - - 0.100 - -
2 - Parameters for prices in the traded sector show lower price stickiness than those for non-traded sector.
4 - Parameter gives the response of GDP deflator to 1% demand shock at the end of the first year
5 - Phillips curve on core inflation
6 - Phillips curve on GDP deflator
1 - For NAWM and BEMOD, only parameters for prices in the non-traded sector are reported, while  for 
PUSKAS, only those for prices in the domestic sector.
3 - Phillips curve on wages; coefficient on expected inflation is restricted to 1; represented coefficients on 
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country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.73 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.04 Ͳ0.32 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.12 Ͳ0.02 0.00 Ͳ0.04 0.08 Ͳ0.04
2 Ͳ0.99 Ͳ0.36 Ͳ0.19 Ͳ1.01 Ͳ0.68 Ͳ0.49 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.06 Ͳ0.28 0.00 Ͳ0.16











































country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.73 Ͳ0.12 Ͳ0.86 Ͳ0.31 0.02 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.17 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.06 Ͳ0.06
2 Ͳ0.99 Ͳ0.36 Ͳ2.81 Ͳ0.98 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.35 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.51 Ͳ0.27 Ͳ0.28 Ͳ0.33













































country ECB Hungary ECB Italy Hungary Latvia ECB Spain Spain Hungary
model NAWM PUSKAS NMCMͲbig5 BIQM NEM LMM NAWM BEMODͲES BEMODͲEMU PUSKAS
type DSGE DSGE Learning Traditional Traditional Traditional DSGE DSGE DSGE DSGE
year
1 Ͳ0.73 Ͳ0.03 Ͳ0.39 Ͳ0.30 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.07 Ͳ0.02 Ͳ0.01 0.02 Ͳ0.10 Ͳ0.05
2 Ͳ0.99 Ͳ0.09 Ͳ0.76 Ͳ0.90 Ͳ0.11 Ͳ0.20 Ͳ0.08 Ͳ0.02 0.12 Ͳ0.24 Ͳ0.24
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8. Appendix C:  Propagation mechanisms in the models 
Here we report how the shocks propagate in the different macro-models, highlighting key 
channels. We start with the DSGE models and then go onto the NMCM before moving to the 
more traditional models. 
In the NAWM DSGE model the impact on prices is significant and broadly similar for the 
foreign or domestic demand shock whereas the disinflationary effects are virtually negligible in 
case the slowdown is driven by a reduction in investment spending. The discrepancy in the 
disinflationary effects is explained by the fact that the investment specific-technology shock 
underlying the assumed reduction in investment spending has substantial supply-side effects 
which mitigate the downward pressures on domestic prices resulting from the implied fall in 
demand. Specifically within the NAWM, both capital, and labour-input related cost of production 
decline in response to shocks to foreign demand and to domestic risk premium, giving rise to 
downward pressures on prices. In contrast, negative investment-specific technology shocks lead 
to a more pronounced decline in the capital stock. As a result, capital becomes the relatively scare 
factor of production and, with wages being sticky, the cost of capital falls by relatively little, 
containing the fall in overall production cost, and hence the decline in prices. 
In the BEMOD DSGE model for both Spain and the euro area, the effect of the economic 
downturn on inflation differs across shocks. Foreign demand shock causes very small price 
changes in the case of aggregate EMU inflation. This shock causes price drops for non-tradable 
consumption goods and tradable consumption goods produced both in Spain and in the rest of the 
euro area, but prices of imported consumption goods (oil-derived and otherwise) are growing. 
The prices of these imported goods are constant in dollars, but when EMU growth slows down 
euro interest rates fall, and the euro depreciates. This offsetting effect of the monetary policy and 
exchange rate reaction is smaller in other shocks, either because the Spanish economy has a 
smaller influence on the common monetary policy or because of the smaller role played by the 
exchange rate. The investment-specific shock is especially interesting in BEMOD since it helps 
notice supply side differences across EMU. In particular, a negative investment shock leads to 
higher supply-side inflationary pressures in Spain than in the rest of the EMU, as investment 
drops faster in Spain and wages adjust more sluggishly. The results for Spain and the rest of the 
EMU are not identical, but clearly the most important factor is the source of the shock. 
In the Hungarian DSGE model (PUSKAS) the domestic price response to a foreign demand 
shock is limited. There are two sectors producing to the domestic and the export market, 
respectively. So there are two Phillips curves, one for the domestic HICP inflation, and one for 38
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the export price inflation. Consequently, slowdown in domestic demand affects only domestic 
firms and thus domestic inflation directly, while slowdown in external demand hits the exporting 
firms, and has only indirect effect on domestic inflation. This results in a significantly smaller 
effect on HICP in the latter case. 
Meanwhile, in the other two scenarios the mechanism is very similar, there are only quantitative 
differences. Obviously, for the latter scenario, the fall in investment is more pronounced, while 
that of consumption is less severe, as the reduction in GDP is driven by the exogenous increase in 
the cost of capital, thus a fall in investment. As the production in the domestic sector is less 
capital-intensive, the domestic prices are less sensitive to a fall in investment than to that in 
consumption. Therefore the reaction of HICP to the fall in investment is smaller than to the 
slowdown in domestic demand (i.e. consumption). Moreover, when the monetary policy (i.e. 
interest rate path) is exogenous, it does not mitigate the effect on inflation, especially in the case 
of the second scenario (fall in domestic demand). 
In the NMCM the main transmission from a negative demand shocks to prices is via marginal 
costs directly affecting the hybrid new Keynesian price and wages Phillips curve so firms respond 
by decreasing prices, and unions respond to rising unemployment by reducing their wage 
demands. As the shock is significant (either by being sharp, or by being protracted) agents (firms, 
households and unions) are surprised and adjust their behaviour accordingly. The adjustment of 
behaviour is quicker in the sharp response leading to a larger decrease in prices. However the 
composition of the shocks is less important as prices are affected by overall level of demand 
rather than the composition. The investment demand shock has less effect, as optimal output is 
lower in this scenario. However there are not significant supply side effects in the short run, 
particularly since technical progress is broadly unchanged. As a result, the response of consumer 
prices to this shock is fairly similar to that of a domestic demand shock. The main differences 
across countries comes from different estimated speeds of adjustment of wages and prices as well 
as estimated adjustment paths of firms, unions and households to factor demands. According to 
the NMCM, France and Netherlands show the largest price effects. 
In the Bank of Italy Quarterly Model the drop in exports induced by the fall in world imports 
and the resulting reduction in output translates in a widening of output gaps, which impacts on 
prices and wages, with some lags. For the investment-specific shock, there are no substantial 
supply-side effects in the short run. As a result, the response of consumer prices to this shock is 
very similar to that generated by a risk premium shock affecting consumption, the main 
difference being a less pronounced disinflation in the sharp but diminishing scenario. The latter 39
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difference is driven by a stronger effect of the investment-specific shock on the desired addition 
to capacity output, which decreases with respect to the baseline more than in the case of a shock 
affecting consumption. With the overall reduction in real GDP fixed, this implies that at the end 
of the projection horizon there is less excess capacity than with a shock to other demand 
components, implying more moderate downward pressures on prices. 
For the Spanish MTBE, the model is mainly demand-driven, so prices are pushed down directly 
by the fall in output. There is also another important channel: in response to the lower demand, 
firms reduce investment and employment; with higher unemployment, wages fall, which pushes 
prices down; and with lower prices, lower wages are bargained, which further decreases prices 
and wages, due to the strong indexation effect in the Spanish economy. The size of this effect on 
prices is different depending on the source of the shock, but the differences are much smaller than 
for example they are with the Spanish BEMOD. 
In the Hungarian NEM model the sensitivity of inflation to the three different GDP slowdown 
scenarios is qualitatively similar due to the fact that the Phillips curve depends on output gap 
representing the inflationary pressure from the demand side. That is, the GDP components do not 
have separated effect on inflation. Slowdown in both foreign and domestic demand enforces the 
private sector to adjust the prices downward compared to the baseline, through whether less 
positive or more negative output gap. However, there are quantitative differences mainly due to 
the supply-side effects. Investment cuts counteract the previous effect through the output gap, as 
it is accompanied by the decrease in capital stock, and therefore in potential output. Therefore 
inflation is more sensitive to the slowdown in foreign demand than that in domestic demand, 
while being less sensitive in case of investment shocks. In addition to the former impacts, the 
lower output temporarily raises unit labour cost, which counteracts the decline in inflation, though 
this impact is less pronounced. 
In Latvia’s LMM model, consumer deflator and HICP are defined as a weighted average of 
domestic prices (GDP deflator) and import prices (which are exogenous). The GDP deflator, in 
turn, is determined by import prices, unit labour costs and the output gap. Therefore, changes in 
inflation are driven by changes in output gap and are almost unaffected by changes in GDP 
composition. The only exception is the case of a decline in investment spending, as changes in 
investments affect the capital stock and, therefore, potential GDP and the output gap. However, in 
the case of LMM this effect is negligible. 40
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